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A PRESIDENTIAL STRIKEOUT, FEDERALISM,
RFRA, STANDING, AND A STEALTH COURT*
Bernard Schwartzt
Just after the 1994 Term ended, James Simon published a book on the
Rehnquist Court entitled The Center Holds.1 After the 1996 Term, no one
would use such a title for the Supreme Court. The 1996 Term decisions con-
firmed, indeed accelerated, the swing to the right that began in 1995. Today,
more than ever, the wag's comment after the Simon book appeared--"[the] title
is just one letter off. 'It should be, The Center Folds' 2-- more accurately char-
acterizes the present Court.
THE PRESIDENT STRmES OUT
Clinton v. Jones' was the most spectacular case decided during the term,
for it presented the rare scenario of a sitting President as defendant. In addition,
the Presidency, which had batted 1.000 in the Rehnquist Court, finally struck
out when the Court held that the President has no immunity from a suit for
civil damages for acts committed before he took office.'
"The King can do no wrong" has long been a basic maxim of English
public law. That principle means that the Queen herself may not be sued. It is
tolerable today only because the Crown's power is now exercised in practice by
Cabinet Ministers and the legality of their acts may be challenged in the courts.
Indeed, as the classic statement by A.V. Dicey tells us, "[w]ith us every official,
from the Prime Minister down to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under
the same responsibility for every act done without legal justification as any
other citizen."5 This, says Dicey, is an essential aspect of the rule of law.6
* Based on remarks delivered at the Conference, Practitioner's Guide to the October 1996 Supreme
Court Term, at the University of Tulsa College of Law, October 31, 1997.
t Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. JAMES F. SIMON, THE CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REmQQUiST COURT(1995).
2. Tony Mauro, Tug of War; In the 1994-1995 Term; Can the Center Hold?, LEGAL TAIES, July 31,
1995, at S23.
3. 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997).
4. See id. at 1639.
5. A.V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTTUTON 193 (10th ed.
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If there was one thing the Framers sought to avoid, it was creating their
Executive in the image of George III. Despite this, the Supreme Court had for
years insulated the President from judicial jurisdiction, much as its English
predecessors had done for the Crown. The leading case over a century ago
refused to allow an action to enjoin the President from enforcing an unconstitu-
tional statute; such an action, the Court ruled, would violate the separation of
powers.7
The Presidential immunity thus recognized does not mean that Presidential
action is unreviewable. Review of the legality of Presidential action can ordi-
narily be obtained in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who attempt to en-
force the President's directive!
Thus, the legality of Presidential orders can normally be reviewed. The
Rehnquist Court has, however, taken a broad approach to Presidential immuni-
ty. In 1992, the Court stated that the President's acts, unlike all other executive
and administrative acts, are "not reviewable for abuse of discretion."9 Though
the Court indicated that Presidential acts may be challenged on constitutional
grounds," there is still broad Presidential immunity, unique in our public law,
permitting a violation of the law which does not raise any constitutional is-
sue.
1
Even where a constitutional claim is presented, how is review to be se-
cured? The Court has reaffirmed the holding that "this [C]ourt has no jurisdic-
tion of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official du-
ties."'2 Additionally, Justice Scalia went out of his way, in a concurrence, to
assert that the same rule applied to a declaratory judgment against the Presi-
dent. 3 The President was thus rendered immune from suits for injunctive or
declaratory relief that challenged his performance of executive functions, even
in cases raising constitutional claims. 4 United States v. Nixon 5 is thus rele-
gated from its position as a constitutional cause c6lbre to one of legal land-
mark pass6, which has no effect on general Presidential immunity in other
cases.
In them, no court has jurisdiction to order injunctive or declaratory relief
against the President. The potential implications are far-reaching. Suppose a
case where a valid constitutional claim is presented. The courts would still not
1987).
6. See id.
7. See Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1866).
8. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 828 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in the judgment).
9. Id. at 801.
10. See id
11. See id.
12. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802-803 (plurality opinion) (quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
475, 501 (1866)); Franklin, 505 U.S. at 827 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1866)).
13. See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 827 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
14. See id.
15. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
(V/ol. 33:77
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be able to grant any remedy against the President. As the Court stated in 1994,
"Where a statute... commits decisionmaking [sic] to the discretion of the
President, judicial review of the President's decision is not available."' 6 Since
there is normally no other effective relief, the result would be unconstitutional
executive action immune from judicial review-ordinarily the very negation of
what we mean by the rule of law.
The upshot is effective immunization of the President from judicial review.
Also, the President has been ruled immune from civil suits for damages caused
by his official acts. 7 Now Clinton v. Jones holds that this immunity does not
apply to suits for damages arising out of events that occurred before the Presi-
dent took office.'" The same would be true, the Court states, of damage suits
based upon Presidential action not "taken in an official capacity"'--i.e., "acts
outside official duties."' There is, the Jones opinion declares, no "immunity
from suit for his unofficial acts."21
One might wish that the Jones opinion had been written more in the grand
manner of a Marshall or a Holmes; the Stevens opinion has all the pedestrian
flair of a traffic-court case. But the holding is clear. For the first time, a sitting
President is subjected to the same civil liability as any other American. ' The
separation of powers is ruled no bar to this exercise of jurisdiction over the
President.'s As one commentator writes, the decision is a "symbolic reaffirma-
tion of the rule of law that... reminds the chief executive.., that for all his
pomp and power, he is just '[the] individual who happens to be president."'24
It is, however, important to realize that, though the rule of law may have
triumphed in Jones, it is all too likely that it will prove only "a famous victo-
ry.,,'s True, the President may now be subject to suit for personal peccadilloes.
But that scarcely affects the broad Presidential immunity otherwise recognized
by the Rehnquist Court. The bottom line is that the President still may not be
sued in all other cases (except in the unique circumstances of the Watergate
Tapes case ). Even if, in theory, the bar does not apply where the complaint
raises a constitutional claim, the Rehnquist Court decisions effectively bar any
remedy against the President in such a case. President Clinton may have struck
out in Jones, but the decision there does not really dent the wholesale Presiden-
tial immunity recognized by the Rehnquist Court.
16. Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 477 (1994).
17. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982).
18. See Jones, 117 S. Ct. at 1639.
19. Id. at 1644.
20. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 759 (1982) (Burger, CJ. concurring)).
21. Id.
22. See id. at 1636.
23. See id. at 1648-49.
24. Stuart Taylor Jr., The Facts of the Matter, NEWSWEEK, June 9, 1997, at 39.
25. 'But what good come of it at last?'
Quoth little Peterin.
'Why that I cannot tell,' said he,
'But 't was a famous victory.'
ROBERT SouTHEy, The Battle of Blenheim, in A CHOICE OF SOuTHEY's VERSE 39 (1970).
26. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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STATE VERSUS FEDERAL POWER
As stated in last year's Symposium, the Rehnquist Court jurisprudence has
been marked by its decisions on federalism.27 These decisions have made for a
renaissance of state versus federal power, reviving notions of federalism dor-
mant for over half a century. The first important Rehnquist decision on the
subject, New York v. United States,' struck down a federal law because it
"commandeered" states into enforcement of federal regulatory provisions.29 In
one of its most noted 1996 Term decisions, Printz v. United States," the Court
applied the holding in New York v. United States to strike down a key portion
of.the Brady Act,' a law passed by Congress commanding state and local law
enforcement officers to conduct background checks on prospective handgun
purchasers and to perform certain related tasks.32 Such a law, like that in New
York, directed state officers to participate in the administration of a federal
regulatory scheme.33 In effect, state officers were pressed into federal service;
such Congressional action, compelling state officers to execute federal laws,
was ruled unconstitutional.' The Constitution rejects the concept of a central
government that may act through the states; instead, it designs a system in
which both governments exercise concurrent authority. Nor is the result
changed by the Necessary and Proper Clause. It gives Congress power to re-
quire or prohibit certain acts, but not the power directly to compel the states or
its officers to require or prohibit those acts.
Until the Rehnquist Court decisions, the dominant theme had been that of
cooperative federalism,35 which made it possible for either government to act
on behalf of the other. The Federal Government has frequently availed itself of
the services of state officers in exercising its own powers. The first Congress
authorized state justices of the peace to issue warrants for the arrest of offend-
ers against federal laws and to admit them to bail. The Fugitive Slave Act of
1793, the Naturalization Act of 1795, and the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 made
use of state courts to enforce their provisions. More recently, state officials have
been employed by the Federal Government in the exercise of its power of emi-
nent domain and in enforcement of the selective service and prohibition laws.
This has, of course, raised the Printz question of the obligation of the
states to lend their officials to execution of federal statutes. In the absence of
state consent, can the National Government impose upon state officials any duty
to enforce federal laws?
27. See Bernard Schwartz, Federalism, Administrative Law, and the Rehnquist Court in Action, 32 TUL-
SA L. 477 (1997).
28. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
29. Id. at 176.
30. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (s)(2) (1994).
32. See id. at 2368-69.
33. See id. at 2369.
34. See id. at 2383-84.
35. See NoRMAN REDLICH ET AL., UNDERSTANDING CONST=IONAL LAW § 2.09 at 57-59 (1995),
[Vol. 33:77
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Until the New York and Printz cases, the Court had held that the Suprema-
cy Clause compels a general affirmative answer. The leading case used to be
Testa v. Katt.36 Under the Federal Emergency Price Control Act, a person
charged more than ceiling prices could bring suit for treble damages in "any
court of competent jurisdiction" 37-- federal, state, or territorial. The Testa suit
was brought in a state court, but the highest state court held that state courts
could not be required to enforce the federal statute." The Supreme Court re-
versed, holding that the decision below disregarded the Supremacy Clause?9
Congress could constitutionally require state courts to hear and decide cases in-
volving the enforcement of federal laws, including penal laws.'
According to Printz however, the Testa holding is limited to state courts.
The Scalia opinion of the Court states that "Testa stands for the proposition that
state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law-a conclusion mandated by the
terms of the Supremacy Clause ('the Judges in every State shall be bound [by
federal law]')."' According to Justice Scalia, "that says nothing about whether
state executive officers must administer federal law."'42 Does this imply the
constitutional heresy that the Supremacy Clause is not applicable to the states
except for the state courts? At any rate, whether the Court's attempt to distin-
guish Testa is valid or not, it is clear from the Scalia opinion that, even if Testa
is not specifically overruled, its holding now applies only to state courts. They
may still be required to apply federal law. But state legislative and executive
officers may no longer be compelled to carry out federal statutes.
There are even broader implications to Printz. Before 1937, the division of
power between states and nation was dominated by what has been termed the
doctrine of dual federalism,43 based upon "two mutually exclusive, reciprocally
limiting fields of power, the governmental occupants of which confront each
other as equals."'  The "constitutional revolution,"'4 that began in 1937 re-
moved the limitations that the dual federalism concept had placed upon federal
power. However, Printz tells us again "that the Constitution established a sys-
tem of 'dual sovereignty,"'" under which "the States... retained 'a residuary
and inviolable sovereignty."'47 Are we now to go back to John C. Calhoun's
conception of the division between state and federal powers?
In one provision of the Constitution, the Eleventh Amendment' expressly
36. 330 U.S. 386 (1942).
37. Id. at 387 (quoting Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, § 205(e), ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942)).
38. See Testa v. Katt, 47 A.2d. 312 (R.I. 1946), rev'd 330 U.S. at 386 (1942).
39. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. at 389.
40. See id. at 390-92.
41. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2381.
42. Id.
43. See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN CONSTTTONAL LAW 42 (1955); EDWARD S. CORWIN, TIM
COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES RIGmS 141 (1962).
44. CORWIN, supra note 43, at 135.
45. EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITTONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. (1941).
46. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376.
47. Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (J. Madison)).
48. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment reads: "The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
1997]
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confirms state immunity from federal power. In its 1996 Seminole Tribe deci-
sion,49 the Court gave new scope to the state immunity from suit provided by
the Eleventh Amendment. Seminole Tribe was followed this past Term in Idaho
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,'° which held that an action by the Tribe for a declara-
tory judgment establishing its entitlement to certain submerged lands in Idaho
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment5 This was true not only of the suit
against the state but also of an action against state officials to prohibit them
from taking any action in violation of the Tribe's rights in the lands.' Here,
too, Ex parte Youngs3 did not trump Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Why not? Coeur d'Alene indicated that Ex parte Young generally applied
in two instances: 1) "where there is no state forum available to vindicate federal
interests";54 and 2) "when the case calls for the interpretation of federal law." 5
In both instances, however, there is need for a case-by-case "careful balancing
and accommodation of state interests when determining whether the Young
exception applies in a given case." Here, the suit is "the functional equivalent
of a quiet title action which implicates special sovereignty interests."57 Since
the Tribe could not maintain a quiet title action against the state, it cannot
achieve "the functional equivalent"'58 by the suit against state officers. The re-
lief sought "would divest the State of its sovereign control over submerged
lands."59
According to Justice O'Connor, concurring, Coeur d' Alene "is unlike a
typical Young action."'
The Young doctrine rests on the premise that a suit against a state official
to enjoin an ongoing violation of federal law is not a suit against the
State. Where a plaintiff seeks to divest the State of all regulatory power
over submerged lands-in effect, to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction to
quiet title to sovereign lands-it simply cannot be said that the suit is not
a suit against the State. I would not narrow our Young doctrine, but I
would not extend it to reach this case."'
Despite the O'Connor disclaimer, one may wonder whether Coeur d'Alene does
not "narrow our Young doctrine."62
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." Id.
49. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
50. 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
51. See id. at 2043.
52. See id. at 2047.
53. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
54. Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2035.
55. Id. at 2036.
56. Id. at 2038.
57. Id. at 2040.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2041.
60. Id. at 2043 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
61. Id. at 2047 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
62. Id.
[Vol. 33:77
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RFRA AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER
One of Justice Brennan's legacies was his opinion in Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan,63 which pushed Congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to its outer limit. More specifically, Morgan recognized Congress' power
to define the substantive scope of the amendment, by upholding a statute pro-
hibiting voter literacy tests, even though the Court had held that, absent Con-
gressional action, such a literacy test did not violate the Fourteenth Amend-
ment 4
In City of Boerne v. Flores,65 the Court refused to follow the Morgan lead
and ruled instead that Congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment does not give it authority to expand the substantive scope of the amend-
ment.' After the decision in Employment Division v. Smith,67 Congress
passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),6 overruling
Smith and requiring the "compelling interest" test to be met in free-exercise
cases.69 Boerne held that RFRA was not authorized by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Enforcement Clause7 Congressional enforcement power, the
Court stated, was remedial and preventive, rather than substantive, in nature.7 '
RFRA, in effect, changed the substantive scope of the Fourteenth Amendment
by overriding the Supreme Court's interpretation of the reach of the Free Exer-
cise Clause: State action that would be valid under Smith would have to be
stricken down under RFRA.
Its enforcement power did not authorize Congress to make such a substan-
tive change in the governing law: "Any suggestion that Congress has a substan-
tive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported."
Instead, Congress has been given only "the power to enforce the provisions of
this article," which means the amendment as interpreted by the Court in a
case such as Smith. The enforcement power does not include authority to over-
rule the amendment's meaning as construed by the Court in Smith, which is
exactly what RFRA attempted to do.
And what of Katzenbach v. Morgan? The Boerne opinion recognized that
there is language in Morgan "which could be interpreted as acknowledging a
power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights contained in § 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment."74 According to Boerne, however, "[tihis is not
63. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
64. See Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959).
65. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
66. See id. at 2172.
67. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to 2000bb-4 (1994).
69. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. at 2162.
70. See id. at 2172.
71. See id. at 2167-68.
72. Id. at 2167.
73. Id. at 2163.
74. Id. at 2168.
19971
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a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one."75
Morgan was different, states Boerne, because it involved what Congress
could have concluded was "invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause" --something not present in Boerne. Of course, the two
cases are different in their facts. However, the Boerne rationale is essentially
inconsistent with that of Morgan. Instead, without acknowledging it, Boerne
adopts the approach urged by Justice Harlan in his Morgan dissent. It would
have been better if Boerne acknowledged this, instead of trying to mask its
refusal to follow Morgan by its distinction without a true difference.
STANDiNG AND A CONUNDRUM
The eyes of law students and even practitioners tend to glaze over when
the subject of justiciability and its different aspects (such as standing) are dis-
cussed. Yet the question of justiciability determines whether even the most im-
portant constitutional issues will be decided by the courts. If, for example, the
review action is brought by a plaintiff who does not have standing, it must be
dismissed, no matter how significant the issues raised or the country's interest
in having them decided.
During the Term surveyed, the Court decided two standing cases worthy of
comment. Though the first to be discussed is the one that made headlines, the
second is perhaps of greater interest to Supreme Court technicians. Raines v.
Byrd" arose out of an action by members of Congress challenging the consti-
tutionality of the landmark Line Item Veto Act," giving the President, for the
first time, power to disapprove portions of bills signed by him. The Court de-
cided that Members of Congress who voted against the Line Item Veto Act did
not have standing to file suit challenging the Act's constitutionality because it
diluted their Article I voting power.79 The claim of dilution of institutional
legislative power was not enough to show injury to plaintiffs as individuals
because it was "wholly abstract and widely dispersed."'
The difficulty with the holding is that the Court had ruled the other way in
Coleman v. Miller8 -a case that had been assumed to settle the law in favor
of legislators' standing. The opinion of the Chief Justice in Raines v. Byrd
states that the Members of Congress' instant "claim does not fall within our
holding in Coleman. ', 2 That is true, the opinion asserts, because "[t]hey have
not alleged that they voted for a specific bill, that there were sufficient votes to
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 117 S. Ct. 2312 (1997).
78. Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.s.CA.).
79. See Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. CL at 2322.
80. Id.
81. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
82. Raines v. Byrd, 117 S. Ct. at 2319-20.
[Vol. 33:77
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pass the bill, and that the bill was nonetheless deemed defeated."' 3 Here, too,
this seems to be a matter of what Coleridge once termed the quality of "same-
ness, with [a] difference"---the difference in facts that characterizes all cases,
but a difference not great enough to justify a different rule.
Once again, we do not know whether the case is distinguished, or whether
the general rule stated in Coleman has been virtually overruled sub silentio. It
would, however, in this commentator's view, now be safer, after Raines, to
conclude that legislators who have voted against a law no longer possess stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of that law.
As stated, the second standing case, Bennett v. Spear,'5 should be of spe-
cial interest to Court aficionados, for it answers the important question on citi-
zen standing left open by the 1992 Defenders of Wildlife case. 6 In the absence
of statute, a plaintiff does not have standing as a citizen to seek judicial review.
However, Congress may provide for citizen standing in a given case. That poses
a constitutional conundrum: If standing is an Article R requirement, how can
Congress authorize a citizen qua citizen, "a person who [otherwise] shows no
case or controversy to call on the courts to review?"'
In strict logic, it is difficult to answer this query. If there is an answer, it is
the so-called private attorney general rationale. As Justice Harlan once stated:
"[I]ndividual litigants, acting as private attomeys-general, 8g ... have standing
to represent the public interest, despite their lack of economic or other personal
interests, if Congress has appropriately authorized such suits." 9 At any rate, it
had been assumed that Congress can confer standing upon any citizen, even one
who does not have the personal interest normally required.
This principle was called into doubt by Defenders of Wildlife, where the
Court indicated for the first time that there may be limits upon statutory stand-
ing, since the "private attorney general" theory may itself be subject to Article
Im limitations. 9 What are those limitations?
Justice Scalia's Defenders of Wildlife opinion did not answer this question,
but he has now given an answer in his Bennett v. Spear opinion of the Court.
In that case, ranch operators and irrigation districts filed an action under the
citizen-suit provision of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"),9' alleging viola-
tions of ESA concerning proposed use of reservoir water to protect certain
species of fish.' The Fish and Wildlife Service had issued a "Biological Opin-
ion" that an irrigation project might affect two endangered species of fish and
identified as a reasonable alternative minimum water levels on certain reser-
83. Id. at 2320.
84. SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERiDGE, BIOGRAPiA LnmEARA 197 (1926).
85. 117 S. Ct. 1154 (1997).
86., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
87. Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 at 21 (1942) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
88. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 131 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
90. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576-78.
91. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (1994).
92. See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. at 1158.
1997]
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voirs.' The Bureau of Reclamation then notified the Service that it would op-
erate the project in compliance with the Biological Opinion.94 The lower court
held that petitioners, who alleged adverse effect because of substantially re-
duced available irrigation water, did not have standing because they asserted
only "recreational, aesthetic, and commercial interests... [that did] not fall
within the zone of interests sought to be protected by ESA, 95 as required by
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.96 The
Court applied the Data Processing requirement to ESA's citizen-standing provi-
sion.'
Commentators have focused upon the Supreme Court's Bennett decision
for the holding that review actions may be brought not only to enforce environ-
mental laws, but also to prevent enforcement. As the New York Times 1996
Term survey puts it, ESA is "interpreted... to permit lawsuits not only by
people who think the Government is doing too little to protect endangered
species but also by those who think Federal regulation has gone too far."98
More significant to students of standing, however, is what the Court tells us
about Congressionally-conferred standing, such as that authorizing citizen suits
under ESA. Defenders of Wildlife told us that statutory standing is subject to
the "case" or "controversy" requirement of Article II. 9 Now Bennett explains
more precisely just what this means.
According to the Bennett opinion, standing has two aspects: Article EII
standing and prudential standing."° The first is, of course, constitutionally
based and must be met even when Congress has enacted a citizen-standing
provision permitting virtually anyone to bring a review action.' The sec-
ond-prudential requirements-may be negated by Congress at any time."°
What Bennett calls the "irreducible constitutional minimum" of standing
under Article III contains three requirements. 3 As stated by Bennett, they are:
(1) that the plaintiff have suffered an "injury in fact"--an invasion of a
judicially cognizable interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and
(b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that there be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the
injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before
the court; and (3) that it be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.'
93. See id. at 1159.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 1160 (quoting Bennett v. Plenert, Civ. No. 93-6076-HO, 1993 WL 669429, at *5 (D. Or. Nov.
18, 1993)).
96. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S.Ct. at 1161.
97. See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
98. Linda Greenhouse, Benchmarks of Justice, N.Y. TIMEs, July 1, 1997, at Al.
99. See Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 576-578.
100. See Bennett v. Spear, 117 S. Ct. at 1161.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 1163.
104. Id.
[Vol. 33:77
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These requirements may not be negated by Congress. Hence, a citizen-
standing suit must be dismissed if plaintiffs do not meet the requirements, even
though a statute allows any citizen to sue. In Bennett, the Court held that the
Article I standing requirements were satisfied."° In particular, plaintiffs had
shown an "injury in fact" by alleging that the amount of available water would
be reduced and they would be adversely affected thereby.'"
The Data Processing "zone of interests" test, on the other hand, is not
demanded by Article III. Instead, it is a prudential, not a constitutional, require-
ment---"reflections of prudential considerations defining and limiting... the
propriety of judicial intervention.' '""F According to Bennett, Congress has the
power to negate the zone-of-interests prudential standing requirement and it did
so in ESA's citizen-suit provision."'8 The ESA term "any person" is taken at
face value; "the obvious purpose... is to encourage enforcement by so-called
'private attorneys general.""'  The result is expanded standing: "standing was
expanded to the full extent permitted under Article II.."
Nor, as already noted, is the expanded standing limited to environmental-
ists alone. It applies to all suits under ESA, including those seeking to prevent
application of environmental restrictions as well as those to implement them.
A STEALTH COURT?
When David H. Souter's nomination to the Court was before the Senate
Judiciary Committee, he was termed "the Stealth nominee"'1 because he had
left virtually no "paper trail" showing his views on different constitutional
issues. Can the Court during the 1996 Term be characterized as a "Stealth
Court" because it drastically changed the law without acknowledging that it had
done so?
Of course, the Rehnquist Court, like its predecessors, leaves a voluminous
paper trail in the opinions published each Term. In fact, from the Court's first
opinions in 1792,"1 the Justices have followed the practice of issuing opinions
to explain their decisions-at first by the English custom of having the Justices
deliver individual opinions seriatim, followed until John Marshall established
the practice of opinions of the Court stating the rationale behind decisions.
Perhaps, as Chief Justice Hughes once said, an opinion only "supplies the
reasons for supporting our predilections."". Still, for the public, the opinion
105. See id. at 1169.
106. See id. at 1164.
107. Wath v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 517-518 (1975).
108. See Bennen, 117 S. Ct. at 1162.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1163.
111. Richard L. Berke, Souter Anecdote: Off the Cuff or From the Script?, N.Y. TImEs, Sept. 16, 1990,
section 1 at 30.
112. See Georgia v. Braislford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792) See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT 20 (1993).
113. WuiAM 0. DOUGILAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIoGRAPHY OF WLijAm 0.
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of the Court is what Hughes called the "rational part""' 4 of its decision. Nev-
ertheless, if the opinion is the part of the decision process where "[plower
should answer to reason,""' 5 that purpose is defeated when the opinion does
not explain, but instead conceals what it has done.
In three of the decisions discussed, the Court virtually overruled important
precedents: If Katzenbach v. Morgan"6 had been followed, Boerne v.
Flores"' would have been decided differently; the same was true of Raines v.
Byrd,"' if Coleman v. Miller"' had governed the decision, and Printz v.
United States,'2 if Testa v. KattM had been applied to the case. Additional-
ly, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene" continued the process of chipping away at the
almost century-old landmark of our public law-Ex Parte Young," which
had begun in 1996. In none of these cases, however, did the Court admit the
virtual overruling that had occurred. Instead, the opinions sought to mask what
had been done by finding distinctions from the earlier cases where there were
really no differences justifying departure from the prior precedents.
Perhaps a tribunal such as the Supreme Court must "live by correcting the
errors of others and adhering to their own."'"4 But when the Court decides to
correct its own errors by relaxing the rule of adherence to precedent, it should
acknowledge what it has done "in frank avowal and full abandonment. '"s
This is precisely what the Court did not do in the important 1996 Term deci-
sions discussed.
The virtual overruling of the Brennan landmark in Katzenbach v. Morgan
and the other key precedents reveals the 1996 Term's swing to the right. Cer-
tainly, as stated above, no one would title a book on the Court today The Cen-
ter Holds, after the way in which the center "folded" during the 1996 Term.
After a decade, Chief Justice Rehnquist, whom Newsweek had once dubbed
"The Court's Mr. Right,""a was finally able to point constitutional jurispru-
dence toward his own conservative image. From the Chief Justice's point of
view, all the same, it was, as the Duke of Wellington once said of Waterloo, a
"close-run thing." Most of the cases signaling the Court's turn to the right were
decided by a bare majority.
In fact, as the Goldstein statistics which follow this paper show, of the 81
argued cases decided with opinion, 16 (20%) were decided by a 5-4 vote,"
DOUGLAS 8 (1980).
114. Id.
115. Jewell Ridge Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers of Am., 325 U.S. 161, 196 (1945)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
116. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
117. 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
118. 117 S. CL 2312 (1997).
119. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
120. 117 S. C. 2365 (1997).
121. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
122. 117 S. Ct 2028 (1997).
123. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
124. Ellison v. Georgia R.R., 13 S.E. 809, 810 (Ga. 1891).
125. BEmAMIN N. CARDOZA, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROcEss 150 (1921).
126. Diane Camper, The Cotrt's Mr. Right, NEWSWEEK, July 23, 1979, at 68.
127. There was also one 5-4 case, where the minority concured in part and dissented in part. See Schinck
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and 12 by 6-3 (over 15%)."2 The Court continues in its tripartite split-with a
conservative wing, (Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas), a liberal wing (Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), and a center (O'Connor and Kennedy). The
votes of the center Justices, particularly Justice Kennedy (who cast fewer dis-
senting votes29 and was with the majority in all of the important cases dis-
cussed), were determinative.' The critical battle continued to be for their piv-
otal votes and the 1996 Term turn to the right was based on the fact that they
joined the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas in the key decisions of
the term.
Those decisions were not only conservative, they were also as activist as
any decided by the Warren and Burger Courts. In fact, as the New York Times
survey of the 1994 Term asserts, "judicial activism, a phrase that conservatives
once hurled as an epithet, easily fits Chief Justice Rehnquist[]"'' and his
Court as well. To be sure, activism is all in the eye of the beholder. Conserva-
tives used to criticize the "activism" of the Warren Court, as liberals now criti-
cize that of the Rehnquist Court. To both, the "activist" decision was the deci-
sion with which they disagreed. Still, it cannot be denied that the 1996 Term
decisions made for a significant shift in jurisprudence, particularly in the rela-
tions between state and federal power. But the Court, as indicated, has not
acknowledged the extent of the shift, indicating instead that it has made only
incremental modifications in the constitutional corpus.
I conclude, as I did last year, by stressing again the close-run nature of the
apparent Rehnquist victory. The close vote in key cases means that the Court's
future course will depend on the appointments made to the Court. That, in turn,
will turn on the President who chooses new Justices, with emphasis on who
will replace the Chief Justice when, as is inevitable, he does leave the Court.
According to Mr. Dooley's now trite observation, the Supreme Court follows
the election returns.' This will be even more true of the 2000 election for
students of the Court. Its outcome may determine the future composition of a
closely-divided Court and the course of its constitutional jurisprudence.
v. Pro-Choice Network, 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).
128. See Appendix.
129. He cast only 6 dissenting votes. See Appendix.
130. Next to Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor cast the fewest dissenting votes: 10. See Appendix.
131. Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: Gavel Rousers; Farewell to the Old Order in the Court, N.Y. TImES,
July 2, 1995, section 4 at 1.
132. FINLEY P. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY's OPINIONS 26 (1901).
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APPENDIX
STATISTICS FOR THE OCTOBER 1996 SUPREME COURT TERM'33
By Thomas C. Goldstein'34
INTRODUCTION
This compilation of Supreme Court statistics provides a summary view of
the recently completed Supreme Court term by reporting how the Court dis-
posed of cases, as well as the degree to which the Justices agreed with each
other. Readers are cautioned, however, that these statistics can give only the
broadest overview of the term and cannot in any sense replace serious study of
the Court's individual decisions.
STATISTICAL BREAKDOWN OF PUBLISHED OPINIONS
Argued Cases and Their Disposition
IINumber of arguments 84Decided by signed opinion 80Dismissed with unsigned opinion IDismissed without opinion 3 I
Decisions: Summary Dispositions (Not Including cases granted, vacated and remanded without opinion)
Sumr reversals and GVRs 10 Summar affirmanes 14
STotal Number of Decisions by Opinion
From oralargument 181 Fromsu rulings0
Splits in Decisions by Opinion (5-4 column does not reflect one decision that is 5.4 in part)
Unanmous9-0 - 15 18-1 16
Unani~m- 29 0 17-2 or 6-2 1 13
6-3 12 5-4 16 4-4 10 Other 0
Treatment of the Lower Court
Reversed or 65 Affirmed 23 Reversed I Other 2
vacated or vacated
in part and
affirmed in
part
Treatment of the United States
Did not 127 Won asa 21 Won as an 124 ot asa 10 Lost as an 9
articipate I art amicus at amicus
133. Copyright © 1997, by Thomas C. Goldstein. These statistics appeared previously as Thomas C.
Goldstein, Statistics for the Supreme Court's October Term 1996, 66 U.S.L.W. 3068-71 (1997).
134. Attorney, Jones Day Reavis & Pogue, Washington, DC.
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Opinion Authorship
Total NumberofOpnlo
Rehnquist 115 ISteen 131 1ortonner 121 1Scalia 28 Kennedy I II
Souter 19 1 Thomas 16 Ginsbur 16 Br 26
Majority or Plurality Opinions
Pe I jRebnQsis I 1 S t ns 1 0 1Oo n r 9 1 scalia 9
Kenned~j I Souter 8 Thomas 1 8 Gins 9 B : J 8
Concurring Opinions
Rehnquist 10 IS.een 14 1 onno, 15 Scia 19 1Kennedy II
Souter 14 1Thom. 13 1Git 14 1B 16 1
Rehnquist 4 1Stevns 17 IOro.no 17 1Scalia 10 1Keney 12
Souter 7 Thomas 5 Gisbur 3 B= 1 12
Unanimous Majority Opinions
Per S Rehnquist 2 Stevens 3 Oonnor 3 Scalia 5
C uiamII
Kenned I Sourer I Thomas 4 1 Ginsg 13 Bc 2
Dissenting Votes
[Total Number
~Rehnquist 112 1Stevens 126 1 oono 1 ;0 1Scia 1 Kenedy 16
Sout 112 1Thos 116 1 Gi 1 7 1BM= 120 1
Number of Times a Justice Was the Only Dissenter In a C ae
Rehnquis I II ISt. 5 Iscaim 1o I0ScaliaO
1 Souter 10 Thms 0 Ginsburg 10 Breyer 0 1 f
Five-To-Four Cases
Five~to-Fosr Cases (ndluding oe case that was 54 on a major Isue)
Nunaberof cases 17
Five-to-Four Caa uc Mlgnest
Rehnquist. OConnor. Scalia, Kennedy. Thomas 8
Stevens. OConnor. Souter, Ginsburg. Breyer 2
Rchnq=4aiass Kenned Souer ThomasI
Stevens, Otoonor. Kennedy, Souter. Breyer I
Stevens. Kennedy. Souter, Ginsburg. Breyer I
Rehnquist, Stvs. )nedy, Sou- . Breyer I
Stevens, Scala. Kennedy. Soutcr. Thomas I
Stevens. OConor, ennedy, Ginsburg. Breyer I
Rehcqus, S esSSouter, Ginsburg. Breyer I
Authorship ofthe Opinion
Rehnsquist I Ste.ens 2 Oonor 2 Sealia 2 Kennedy 4
Souter 13 1Thoma 12 1Gi= 0 1BM II
Membership In the Majority
Rehnqust I I Tho s I0 Io . 12 Scali I10 o nndy 14
Souter Thoma 10 Ginsbur 5 Breyer 7
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Justices' Voting Relationships
Stevens O'Connor I Scalia
8 - 82% 18 - 88%
Kennedy
8- 89%
Souter
5 - 76%
Thomas I Ginsburg I Breyer
191 i9o 91 i91 91 91 .I ___
Rehnquist so 55%
18 -64%
66 - 73% 52 - 68% 77 - 85% 53 - 69% 67 74% 156 -62% 53 58%
14 -89% 110 -73% 110 -69%
2 -66% 12 84% [2 - 90% 0 -89% 1 80% 2 -91% 3 -76%
31 -34 114-16% 19 -10% 110'11% 18 -20% 48 .9% j22-24% 125"-7
Stevens 50 -56% 36 -40% 58 - 64% 164 -70% 40 - 44% 70 -77% 67 -74%
7 -63% 17 -58% 17 - 71% 9 -80% 113 - 58 7 -85% 9 -84%
4 -68% 3- 62% 3 -75% 3- 84% 3- 62% 13 -88% 4 88%
29 32% 35 -38% 23 - 25% 415 -16% 35 38% 41 12% 11 12%
O'Connor 53 -70% 68 -76% 62 -69% 69 - 77% 55 -61% 55 61%
17 -89% [9 -86% ,7 -77% 12 - 90% 13 -76% I -73%
1 90% 2 -88% 4 -81% 0 - 90% 3 -79% 2 -76%
-10% 11 -12% 17 -19% 9 - 10% 19 -21% 22 24%
Scalia
Kennedy
KEY
Total No. of Cases Decided Together (e.g., for Rehnquist and
Stevens: 91)
No. and % of Cases Agreed in Full (e.g., for Rehnquist and Stevens:
50 cases = 55%)
No. of Cases Agreed in Part &
% of Cases Agreed in Full or in Part (e.g., for Rehnquist and Stevens:
58 cases (50 + 8) = 64%)
No. of Cases Agreed in the Judgment &
% of Cases Agreed in Full, in Part, or in the Judgment
(e.g., for Rehnquist and Stevens: 60 cases (50 + 8 + 2) = 66%)
No. and % of Cases Disagreed Completely (e.g., for Rehnquist and
Stevens: 31 cases = 34%)
65-7% 48-53% 180-880 43-47% 41-45%
12 -85% 17 - 71% '9 .98% 22 71% 16 63%
2 87% 4 -7 6% ji 99% 2 -745 4 67%
12 -13% E22- 24% 1 -1% 24.26% 13 -33%
66 - 73% [68 - 75% 58 - 64% 57 - 63%
5 - 78% 9 - 85% 10 - 75% 6 - 69%
4 - 82% 2 - 87% 3 - 78% [ - 73%
16 -18% 12 -13% 20 22% 25 -27%
Souter
55 60% 68 75% 165 -71%
11 73% 11 87% 10 -82%
3 -76% 4 -91% 4 .87%
22 24% 8 -9% 12 -13%
Thomas
91
46 - 51%
17 - 69%
24 - 26%
Ginsburg
44 -485o
11 607o
3 .64%
33 -36%
91
69 -765P
HI 88%
2-90%7
9 -10%0
-I 1- f 4
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